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Severe consequences of the global fi nancial 
crisis resulted in re-thinking the risk management 
processes and approaches. OECD (2009), BIS 
(2008), FSA (2008) and IIF (2007) suggested 
that corporate risks should be “high on the 
agenda” of every organization, highlighting the 
need for a comprehensive (enterprise-wide) 
risk management framework. What has been 
realized in the aftermath of the global fi nancial 
crisis is that a failure to transmit information 
about risk exposures can be attributed to the 
traditional silo-based risk management (TRM) 
(OECD, 2009). In TRM risks are managed 
in isolation by business unit managers with 
little oversight or communication of how 
particular risk management decisions affect 
other corporate risks and corporate strategy. 
Consequently, more and more companies 
around the world are moving away from TRM to 
a more holistic approach known as enterprise 
risk management (ERM) (CGMA, 2015).
To bring benefi ts in terms of value protection 
and value enhancement, ERM should be 
integrated into the corporate strategy, decision 
making process and corporate culture (Lam, 
2003; Meulbroek, 2002; Nocco & Stulz, 2006; 
Segal, 2011). Identifi cation of key risk factors 
and determination of their importance by using 
risk assessment matrix is very important if 
risk management is used as a strategic tool 
(Vacik, Fotr, Špaček, & Souček, 2014). Nocco 
and Stulz (2006) claim that ERM increases 
company value by decreasing the probability 
of low-tailed outcomes. ERM does this by 
enabling companies transfer non-core risks, 
like fi nancial risks, to other market participants 
and to undertake more core-business risks 
which the fi rm has a competitive advantage 
in managing. ERM thus encompasses both, 
strategic risk taking as well as deliberate risk 
hedging, implying a balance between the dual 
nature of risk (threats vs opportunities) to attain 
value creation.
The existing ERM literature is rich in 
textbooks (e.g. Fraser & Simkins, 2010; Lam, 
2003; Segal, 2011), as well as in review and 
professional papers (Lam, 2001; Meulbroek, 
2002; Nocco & Stulz, 2006), which claim, 
in a very straightforward way, that because 
ERM offers a more comprehensive way of 
managing risks it contributes to value creation 
in companies. However, academic research on 
ERM is still in its infancy (Bromiley, McShane, 
Nair, & Rustambekov, 2014). Empirical research 
that explores if and how ERM actually affects 
company performance and creates value is 
scarce. Most studies explore ERM’s infl uence on 
the performance and market value of fi nancial 
companies, mostly insurance companies 
(e.g. Baxter, Bedard, Hoitash, & Yezegel, 2013; 
Eckles, Hoyt, & Miller, 2014; Grace, Leverty, 
Phillips, & Shimpi, 2015; Hoyt & Liebenberg, 
2011; McShane, Nair, & Rustambekov, 2011), 
and there are just a few studies addressing 
ERM’s effects in non-fi nancial companies 
(e.g. Gordon, Loeb, & Tseng, 2009).
According to the existing ERM literature, the 
overarching objective of ERM is to contribute to 
the fundamental value creation process. Yet, 
none of the existing studies explore if ERM 
actually increases the fundamental company 
value or is it just the latest fashion in management 
tools. This is the question we try to answer. 
The absence of empirical evidence about 
ERM’s impact on the company’s fundamental 
goal – shareholders’ value enhancement – is 
a limitation to the growth and development of 
ERM as a discipline. Considering that ERM has 
the longest tradition in the United States (Lam, 
2001; Meulbroek, 2002), we investigate the 
effects of ERM in large U.S. companies, but the 
implications of this research are both regionally 
and internationally relevant.
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This paper thus provides evidence on 
the ERM’s long-term impact on a set of 
fundamental value drivers of S&P 500 non-
fi nancial companies, over the period from 2003 
to 2012. Besides providing additional evidence 
on ERM effects in non-fi nancial companies, this 
study offers a different approach in examining 
ERM by exploring if ERM affects a company’s 
fundamental value and not its market value like 
other studies do. Also, unlike other studies, it 
shows evidence of ERM’s long-term impact. 
For that purpose, we measure the number of 
years ERM is in place. Other studies have used 
an ERM index (Gordon et al., 2009), a dummy 
variable (Hoyt & Liebenberg, 2011; Eckles et 
al., 2014), the S&P’s ERM rating (Baxter et al., 
2013; McShane et al., 2011) or an ERM level 
of sophistication (Grace et al., 2015). These 
measures do not take into account the number 
of years a company has spent in implementing 
and using ERM. We believe this is important 
as ERM is not an overnight process and 
practitioners usually state that it takes from three 
to fi ve years to develop a mature ERM system 
within an organization (Fraser & Simkins, 2010). 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that 
companies using ERM for a longer time will 
experience more of its benefi ts.
The paper is organized as follows. In 
section 1, we provide a review of the existing 
literature and develop our hypothesis about 
ERM’s effects on a set of fundamental 
value determinants. Section 2 describes the 
econometric model and variables employed, 
as well as sampling and data collection. In 
section 3, we present the results of our empirical 
analysis. The last section discusses the results 
and concludes the paper.
1. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
Development
According to the existing literature, ERM is an 
important element of an effective corporate 
governance system that encompasses 
activities and strategies which enable the 
company to identify, measure, reduce or 
exploit, as well as to control and monitor the 
exposure to various types of corporate risks 
– strategic, fi nancial, operational, reporting as 
well as compliance risks. The primary aim of 
ERM is to increase the likelihood that strategic 
objectives are realized and shareholders’ value 
is preserved and enhanced. However, by 
adopting a systematic and integrated approach 
to corporate risk management, ERM should 
improve corporate sustainability and lower 
a company’s overall risk of failure, making 
positions for other stakeholders more secure 
and valuable. Although many authors explored 
the effects of hedging as a risk management 
technique and found that hedging stabilizes 
expected earnings and cash fl ows, reduces the 
probability of fi nancial distress and agency cost 
of debt (Campbell & Kracaw, 1987; Dolde, 1995; 
Haushalter, 2000; Haushalter, Heron, & Lie, 
2002; Mian, 1996; Minton & Schrand, 1999; 
Smith & Stulz, 1985; Stulz, 1984), increases 
the growth potential of the company (Froot, 
Scharfstein, & Stein, 1993; Gay & Nam, 1998; 
Géczy, Minton, & Schrand, 1997; Haushalter, 
2000; Haushalter et al., 2002; Hoshi, Kashyap, 
& Scharfstein, 1991; Minton & Schrand, 1999; 
Miloš Sprčić & Šević, 2012; Nance, Smith, & 
Smithson, 1993), and consequently increases 
the company’s value, empirical evidence on 
ERM effects in companies is relatively scarce.
Five empirical studies investigating ERM’s 
effects on companies’ fi nancial performance 
and market values have been conducted so far. 
The results of these studies are mixed; however 
evidence of positive ERM effects is predominant. 
The study by Gordon et al. (2009) revealed 
that in high-performing ERM companies, the 
effectiveness of ERM is moderated by industry 
competition, complexity, size and board 
monitoring. This suggests that contingency 
variables are taken more seriously by high-
performance companies in their implementation 
of ERM. Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) found 
a positive effect of ERM implementation on 
a company’s market value measured by 
Tobin’s Q. Baxter et al. (2013) found that 
higher ERM quality is associated with greater 
complexity, less resource constraint, and better 
corporate governance in fi nancial services 
fi rms. Controlling for such characteristics, they 
found that higher ERM quality is associated 
with improved accounting performance. Eckles 
et al. (2014) found that insurance companies 
with ERM experience a reduction in stock 
return volatility and that operating profi ts per 
unit of risk (ROA/return volatility) increase 
after ERM adoption, indicating a positive 
effect of ERM on the company’s performance. 
The only study suggesting that ERM does 
not infl uence a company’s value is McShane 
et al. (2011). Although they fi nd a positive 
relationship between an insurance company’s 
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S&P ERM rating and its market value as the 
rating increases from ‘weak’ to ‘adequate with 
a positive trend’, they do not fi nd additional 
increases in market value as the rating moves 
towards the more sophisticated ERM levels. 
This means that better TRM increases market 
values, but moving from TRM to ERM is not 
perceived by investors as a value added activity.
The current literature did not develop formal 
models of mechanisms through which ERM 
is supposed to affect a company’s value. We 
therefore turn to models of corporate valuation 
as our starting point. Two commonly used 
models of absolute corporate value are the 
residual income model (RI) and the discounted 
cash-fl ow model (DCF). The RI model describes 
the value of a company as:
 (1)
where: VC = fundamental (intrinsic) value of 
company; BVE0 = current book value of equity; 
RIt = residual income in period t; rC = the cost 
of capital.
The value of a company is increased either 
through a higher expected residual income and/
or a lower cost of capital, which is the discount 
rate in the model. Residual income is defi ned as 
the “surplus” that the company achieves within 
a certain period after it has settled all operating 
costs, including the cost of equity. Residual 
income is usually calculated by using one of the 
following formulas:
1. RESIDUAL INCOME = Net Operating Profi t 
after Taxes – (Invested Capital x Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital)
2. RESIDUAL INCOME = Invested Capital 
x (Return on Invested Capital – Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital).
For a company to create value, the rate 
of return on invested capital should be above 
the total cost of capital. The value of residual 
income depends on the units of capital invested 
as well, so if the value of invested capital is 
greater, residual income is higher, assuming 
that capital is invested in profi table investments.
The DCF model determines the company’s 
value in the following way:
 (2)
where: VC = present value of the company; 
FCF0 = current free cash fl ow; g = expected 
growth rate of future FCF; WACC = weighted 
average cost of company’s capital.
In this model, a company’s value is 
a function of three variables: 1) free cash 
fl ows from existing investments, 2) expected 
growth rate that determines the value of future 
cash fl ows, and 3) weighted average cost of 
capital. A company’s value will increase with 
larger free cash fl ows, higher growth rates and 
lower cost of capital. Based on both models 
it is straightforward to see that ERM adoption 
could affect company’s value either by affecting 
its cash fl ows or by affecting its cost of capital. 
In this paper we investigate how ERM affects 
variables related to cash fl ows and leave the 
effects on cost of capital for future research. 
Apart from the cost of capital, we can thus 
identify fi ve corporate value determinants:
1. Net operating profi t after taxes (NOPAT),
2. Return on invested capital (ROIC),
3. Invested capital (IC),
4. Free cash fl ows from existing investments 
(FCF),
5. Expected growth rate that determines the 
value of the future cash fl ows (g rate).
The primary aim of ERM is to increase the 
likelihood that company’s strategic objectives are 
realized and shareholders’ value is preserved 
and enhanced. To achieve this goal, ERM 
considers the interactive effects of different risk 
events and offers a balance between the dual 
nature of risk - ensuring effective protection from 
threats and seizing the opportunities. Therefore, 
if ERM is implemented as a strategic tool, 
sales revenues of the company should grow 
because of better identifi cation and undertaking 
of profi table opportunities. For example, 
thoughtful risk taking activities could provide 
new market opportunities, new customers, or 
the development of new innovative products, 
that can increase the value of sales. On the 
other hand, reasoned hedging of risks that the 
company does not want to carry over can provide 
stabilization of operative revenues and/or costs. 
For example, concluding forward contracts with 
key suppliers can reduce the cost of raw materials 
and ancillary services. This is consistent with 
the macro benefi ts of ERM described by Nocco 
and Stulz (2006). They claim that companies 
can earn a long-run competitive advantage 
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through ERM since it enables them to transfer 
the non-core risks, like fi nancial risks, which 
can be transferred effectively through derivative 
instruments. Due to this possibility, the company 
can undertake more core business risks that 
the fi rm has competitive advantage in bearing. 
We can therefore assume that companies with 
ERM should be more effective in undertaking 
business risks necessary to achieve their goals, 
while they are better protected from fi nancial 
risks. By creating synergies between different 
risk management activities ERM improves 
capital effi ciency. Hence, we expect that ERM 
is positively related to NOPAT, ROIC, and the 
expected growth rate.
On the other hand, ERM could reduce 
the problem of underinvestment in fi nancially 
constrained companies. Froot et al. (1994) 
demonstrated how the principles of the pecking 
order theory could help develop a coherent risk-
management strategy. In general, the supply of 
internally generated funds does not equal the 
investment demand for funds – sometimes 
there is an excess supply, and sometimes there 
is less than needed. Due to high cost of external 
fi nancing, this imbalance shifts investment 
away from the optimal level. Risk management 
can reduce this imbalance and the resulting 
investment distortion as it enables companies 
to better align their demand for funds with their 
internal supply of funds. Froot et al. (1994) 
argue that risk management allows companies 
to transfer funds from situations in which they 
have an excess supply to situations in which 
they have a shortage. In this respect, ERM 
should act in a similar way and we therefore 
argue that ERM increases the invested capital, 
because it stabilizes and increases operative 
earnings and cash fl ows. Lower volatility of 
expected cash fl ow increases the probability 
of having suffi cient internal funds for planned 
investments and eliminates the need either to 
cut profi table projects or to pay high transaction 
costs for external funding. We therefore expect 
to fi nd that ERM is positively related to the level 
of IC, as well as to the size of cash fl ows (FCF). 
Our research hypothesis is thus the following:
H1: ERM positively affects the proposed set of 
fundamental value determinants.
2. Method
We test our hypothesis empirically with 
a reduced form model, where value determinants 
are related to ERM use, controlling for other 
factors that can affect the value determinants.
 (3)
where Value determinantj are NOPAT, IC, ROIC, 
FCF, and the expected growth rate g.
We exploit the panel structure of the 
collected data and apply the difference-in-
difference logic to identify the effects of ERM 
on value determinants. By using the fi xed-
effects (FE) approach to estimate our model 
we eliminate all company-specifi c unobserved 
effects, which are constant in time and might 
affect our dependent variables, and thus 
minimize the omitted variable bias (Wooldridge, 
2002). We also include exogenous time-effects 
to control for changes in macroeconomic 
conditions that are the same for all companies 
in the sample. Compared to a straightforward 
pooled OLS estimation, FE produces unbiased 
coeffi cients and standard errors that are 
corrected for the correlation of idiosyncratic 
error term over time for a given company. Our 
econometric model is thus the following:
 
(4)
where VDit are value determinants NOPATit, 
FCFit, ICit, ROICit, and the g_rateit of company i in 
year t; ERMit is 1 if company i has ERM in year 
t and 0 otherwise; Control variablesit are Sizeit, 
Leverageit, Growth opportunitiesit, Dividend 
policyit, and Volatilityit of company i in year t; ui 
are company-specifi c effects, μt are year-specifi c 
effects, and εit are idiosyncratic error terms.
A positive signifi cant coeffi cient β1 in equation 
(4) indicates that ERM is associated with 
a higher value of a particular value determinant. 
The coeffi cient is predicted to be positive for all 
value determinants. We run the model also by 
including indicator variables for the duration of 
ERM instead of the dummy variable ERM. In this 
case, a positive signifi cant coeffi cient implies that 
ERM increases companies’ value determinants 
after a certain period of time: 
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For example, a positive signifi cant 
coeffi cient β5 (in equation 5) indicates that ERM 
affects the value driver after fi ve years of use.
2.1 Variables’ Measurement
One of the major challenges of ERM studies is 
how to identify companies that employ ERM. To 
determine whether a company uses ERM we 
followed the methodology used by Gordon et 
al. (2009), Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011), and 
Eckles et al. (2014). We performed a thorough 
search of companies’ SEC fi lings for every 
company in the sample and analyzed in detail 
sections of fi lings where keywords related 
to ERM appeared. We took into account the 
following elements and characteristics of ERM: 
integration of risks identifi cation, analysis, 
measurement and management process, 
active involvement of the board in the ERM 
process, integration of ERM into corporate 
strategy and corporate culture, organization of 
ERM workshops, calculation of probability and 
signifi cance of identifi ed risks, creation of a Risk 
map, and appointment of a Risk Champion 
(Risk Offi cer). This allowed us to determine in 
which year the company implemented ERM. 
Additionally, as a means of a double-check, we 
did a search in Lexis-Nexis and PR Newswire 
for any news announcements about ERM 
for each of the companies in the sample, as 
well as a Google search, in order to look for 
any additional information. Examples of ERM 
and non-ERM companies are presented in 
the Appendices A and B. Since there was no 
evidence of discontinued use of ERM, we 
measure the duration of ERM programs (ERM 
years) by counting the number of years since 
ERM was adopted.
The variables used to measure the value 
determinants are calculated similarly to the 
existing literature. Net operating profi t after 
taxes (NOPAT) is determined as earnings 
before interest and taxes (EBIT) less taxes. 
Total invested capital (IC) is determined 
as working capital plus fi xed assets and 
investments. ROIC is the return on invested 
capital, calculated as the ratio of NOPAT to IC. 
The expected growth rate (g_rate) is calculated 
as the ratio of the change in invested capital 
to the level of IC (Damodaran, 2012). Free 
cash fl ow (FCF) is calculated as NOPAT plus 
depreciation and amortization minus capital 
and operative expenditures. To correct for the 
effect of different magnitudes, we use natural 
logarithms of NOPAT, IC, and FCF.
We control for a set of variables that 
potentially infl uence the value determinants: 
company size, fi nancial structure (leverage), 
growth opportunities, dividend policy, and 
volatility. We measure company size with the 
natural logarithm of total assets to correct 
for the effect of different magnitudes and to 
reduce the effect of skewness in the distribution 
(Size). Because larger companies can exploit 
the economies of scale better, we believe 
that company size is positively related to its 
fundamental value. However, some studies 
found an insignifi cant or even negative effect of 
size on companies’ value (Allayannis & Weston, 
2001; McShane et al., 2011). Therefore, we 
make no a priori prediction regarding the effect 
of company size on its value determinants.
Leverage controls for the relation between 
a company’s capital structure and its value 
determinants. We measure Leverage as 
the ratio of the book value of long-term debt 
to the market value of equity (Allayannis & 
Weston, 2001; Titman & Wessels, 1988). 
According to the Modigliani-Miller’s trade-off 
theory (Modigliani & Miller, 1963), an increase 
in the fi nancial leverage has a positive effect 
on the cost of capital and a fi rm’s value, as 
long as the present value of tax savings is 
greater than the cost related to the increased 
probability of bankruptcy. However, increasing 
the value of debt above the optimal level raises 
the probability of bankruptcy, which increases 
the cost of fi nancial diffi culties and the cost of 
capital, and decreases the company’s value. 
The predicted sign of the relation between 
leverage and value determinants is therefore 
a priori ambiguous.
By combining the approaches of DeMarzo 
and Duffi e (1991), Gordon et al. (2009), and 
McWilliams and Siegel (2000) we proxy the 
growth opportunities with a historical (t-1) ratio, 
calculated as capital expenditures plus R&D 
expenditures, all divided by sales (Growth opp). 
More growth opportunities are likely to increase 
a company’s value determinants, therefore, we 
predict a positive relation between them.
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Following Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011), 
we include a proxy of the dividend policy as 
a control variable. We use a dividend payment 
indicator, which has value 1 if dividends were 
paid out in a particular year t, and 0 otherwise 
(Dividend policy). Again, we cannot make 
predictions regarding the expected sign as, 
according to the corporate fi nance theory, 
dividends can affect company’s value both 
positively and negatively. Positively, because 
a dividend payment represents an indicator 
of a company’s fi nancial strength to investors 
expecting part of the required return in the form 
of dividends. However, if the investors think 
that the money paid out through dividends 
could be reinvested into profi table investment 
opportunities, thereby adding value to 
shareholders wealth, a dividend payment can 
reduce a company’s value.
We include volatility among explanatory 
variables to control for differences in volatility 
between ERM and non-ERM companies. The 
effect of ERM is thus estimated conditional 
on volatility. Volatility is measured with the 
coeffi cient of variation of quarterly EBIT 
(Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003), calculated as 
the ratio of EBIT’s standard deviation and its 
mean annual value. Tab. 1 summarizes the 
measurement of our variables.
2.2 Sampling and Data Collection
The research is conducted on the U.S. market 
among 258 non-fi nancial companies that were 
constituents of the S&P 500 index from 2003 to 
2012. The industry structure of the sample at 
2-digits SIC Code is presented in the Appendix 
(Tab. A1). From the Compustat North America 
database we collected accounting data for the 
258 companies in our sample for the 2003-
2012 period, and constructed a panel with 2,580 
company-year observations. We also collected 
data from the year 2002 to calculate variables 
entering the models with a one-year lagged value. 
We eliminated cases with logically impossible 
values (e.g. total assets lower than current 
assets, total debt lower than long-term debt 
etc.), cases with ‘false positive’ ratios produced 
by a negative denominator and numerator, and 
cases with negative shareholder’s equity.
By the end of the observed period, 
176 companies from the sample were identifi ed 
as having implemented an ERM system, while 
82 companies have not implemented ERM. Out 
of the 176 ERM companies almost half have 
implemented it in 2010 (33 percent of the total 
sample). Among the companies in the sample, 
only 11 had an ERM system in all of the observed 
years. This indicates that ERM is a rather novel 
Variables: Defi nitions:
ERM 1 if company has ERM, 0 if company does not have ERM
ERM years Number of years a company is using ERM
NOPAT LN (EBIT less income taxes), where EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes
FCF LN (NOPAT plus depreciation and amortization minus capital and working capital 
expenditures)
IC LN (Working capital plus fi xed assets and investments)
ROIC NOPAT to total invested capital (NOPAT to IC)
g_rate The change in invested capital (IC) to the level of invested capital (IC)
Size LN of total assets
Leverage The book value of long-term debt to the market value of equity
Growth opp Capital and R&D expenditures to sales (historical – one year lagged)
Dividend policy 1 if company paid out dividends, 0 if company did not pay out dividends
Volatility Coeffi cient of variation of quarterly EBIT, where EBIT is earnings before interest 
and taxes 
Source: own
Tab. 1: Measurement of variables
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approach to corporate risk management and 
that its broader implementation started during 
or after the global fi nancial crisis. In total, we 
have 751 (c. 30%) company-year observations 
with ERM. Tab. 2 shows the descriptive 
statistics for variables used for estimation of 
the models.
3. Results
Results presented in Tab. 3 do not offer strong 
support for our predictions regarding the 
associations between ERM and fundamental 
value drivers. In the estimated models, ERM 
has a positive signifi cant effect only on the 
level of IC (column 3; p < .05). Specifi cally, 
the results indicate that companies with ERM 
have on average a 2 percent higher invested 
capital compared to companies without 
ERM—controlling for size, leverage, growth 
opportunities, dividend policy, volatility, and 
taking into account companies’ individual and 
year effects. Contrary to our expectations, 
ERM has a signifi cant negative effect on the 
growth rate g (column 5; p < .05). The results 
suggest that ERM companies have on average 
a 1.9 percentage point lower expected growth 
rate compared to companies without ERM. 
Since we proxied the expected growth rate g 
with a ratio of the IC change to the IC level, we 
can conclude that ERM seems to decrease the 
change in invested capital. This also implies 
that either the effect of ERM on ROIC or its 
effect on the reinvestment rate is negative. The 
estimated effect on ROIC is indeed negative, 
although statistically insignifi cant (column 4). 
Moreover, consistent with this are also the signs 
and sizes of ERM effects on NOPAT (negative) 
and IC (positive). The effect on NOPAT is not 
signifi cant, but contrary to our expectations, 
the sign is negative. Taken together, our 
results indicate that ERM companies are more 
conservative in their investment strategies. 
Companies that implemented ERM have more 
invested capital in general, however, they seem 
to invest less additional capital (and in possibly 
low-risk/low-return projects), thus resulting in 
smaller expected growth rates.
To get more insight into our benchmark 
results, we need to know i) in what way 
companies that ultimately implemented ERM 
were different from companies that never 
implemented ERM, and ii) how were the 
companies with ERM different after ERM 
implementation. For this purpose, we fi rst test the 
differences in value determinants on a restricted 
sample of company-year observations without 
ERM, presented in Tab. 4. The results show that 
the average IC and g_rate of companies, which 
later implemented ERM, were not different from 
the ones in companies that never implemented 
ERM, in a statistically signifi cant way (p > 0.05). 
On the other hand, NOPAT, FCF, and ROIC 
were on average higher in companies that 
later implemented ERM. The t-tests of control 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ERM 2,580 0.291 0.454 0 1
ERM years 2,580 0.975 1.963 0 10
NOPAT 2,515 6.983 1.151 0 10.742
FCF 2,307 6.725 1.289 1.386 10.659
IC 2,506 9.205 1.151 5.901 12.505
ROIC 2,506 0.122 0.093 -0.331 2.096
g_rate 2,504 0.023 0.107 -1.427 0.612
Size 2,580 9.524 1.141 6.847 13.590
Leverage 2,580 0.274 0.710 0 24.252
Growth opp 1,705 0.110 0.095 0 0.863
Dividend policy 2,580 0.813 0.390 0 1
Volatility 2,579 7.486 8.733 -25.121 149.200
Source: own
Tab. 2: Descriptive statistics of variables used in models
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variables are signifi cant for all of the, except 
Leverage, and confi rm that these variables 
should be controlled for in regressions.
Next, we estimate the benchmark model on 
a restricted sample with only ERM-companies 
and thus test if the value determinants in 
these companies were different after ERM 
implementation. The results in Tab. 5 again 
show a positive signifi cant difference only for 
the level of IC: after ERM implementation, 
companies with ERM had on average 
a 2.3 percent higher IC compared to periods 
before they implemented ERM. This again 
indicates that the effects of ERM programs are 
mostly associated with increasing the level of 
IC, while the effects on other value drivers are 
rather small and possibly even negative.
We further investigate the effects of ERM by 
replacing the dummy ERM variable with indicator 
variables for the number of years a company 
is using ERM (Tab. 6). The coeffi cients show 
differences with respect to observations without 
ERM. Our results indicate that after one or two 
years of using ERM, IC is increased by around 
0.02 percent (the coeffi cient for two years 
is only marginally statistically insignifi cant, 
p = 0.0526). In the following years, the effect 
is mostly slightly above or below this number, 
which indicates that the duration of the ERM 
program does not affect the IC, however, the 
adoption does. Also after one or two years of 
using ERM, ROIC seems to drop by around 
0.9 percentage point (the coeffi cients are 
marginally statistically insignifi cant at p = 0.0514 
and p = 0.124). The negative effects on ROIC 
seem to become smaller in later years. Also the 
growth rate is on average 2.8 percentage points 
lower after two years of using ERM compared 
to observations without ERM. On the other 
hand, the estimations for FCF suggest that the 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 NOPAT FCF IC ROIC g rate
ERM -0.018 -0.047 0.020* -0.007 -0.019*
(-0.43) (-0.92) (2.45) (-1.24) (-2.10)
Size 0.812*** 0.645*** 1.085*** -0.044** 0.030*
(5.14) (5.40) (72.57) (-3.08) (1.97)
Leverage -0.182** -0.153 0.006 -0.030* -0.015
(-3.20) (-1.43) (0.79) (-2.42) (-0.90)
Growth opp. -1.649** -1.671** 0.069 -0.239*** 0.065
(-2.62) (-3.29) (1.29) (-4.20) (0.74)
Dividend policy 0.128 0.053 0.007 0.026* 0.009
(1.72) (0.75) (0.43) (2.36) (0.48)
Volatility 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001
(4.43) (3.68) (0.62) (3.79) (1.06)
Constant -0.835 0.679 -1.087*** 0.517*** -0.254
(-0.57) (0.62) (-8.07) (4.02) (-1.87)
Observations 1,657 1,612 1,644 1,644 1,644
No. clusters 178 178 172 172 172
R2_within 0.435 0.216 0.941 0.210 0.031
Source: own
Note: FE estimator, company and year effects included; t-statistics in parentheses based on cluster-robust SE; * p<0.05, 
** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Tab. 3: Benchmark model regression results
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(SD) t test p value
NOPAT 6.954 1.088 6.756 1.210 -3.610 0.000*
FCF 6.712 1.229 6.510 1.306 -3.213 0.001*
IC 9.135 1.090 9.041 1.245 -1.687 0.092
ROIC 0.131 0.113 0.109 0.073 -4.856 0.000*
g_rate 0.028 0.115 0.024 0.105 -0.843 0.399
Size 9.469 1.071 9.319 1.212 -2.820 0.005*
Leverage 0.285 0.993 0.236 0.451 -1.295 0.195
Growth opp 0.108 0.100 0.126 0.099 3.022 0.003*
Dividend policy 7.379 7.847 6.625 7.236 -2.114 0.035*
Volatility 0.810 0.393 0.762 0.426 -2.477 0.013*
Source: own
Note: * p<0.05.
Tab. 4: ERM companies (before ERM implementation) compared to non-ERM companies – t test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NOPAT FCF IC ROIC g rate
ERM -0.000 -0.084 0.023* -0.000 -0.008
(-0.01) (-1.30) (2.24) (-0.07) (-0.65)
Size 0.866*** 0.741*** 1.097*** -0.041* 0.020
(3.94) (4.74) (55.28) (-2.10) (1.01)
Leverage -0.197* -0.153 0.018 -0.073*** -0.048
(-2.35) (-1.45) (0.94) (-5.26) (-1.89)
Growth opp. -0.822* -1.361* 0.154* -0.153** 0.200*
(-2.15) (-2.47) (2.41) (-2.86) (2.03)
Dividend policy 0.185 0.091 0.024 0.033* -0.001
(1.83) (1.19) (1.82) (2.20) (-0.02)
Volatility 0.008*** 0.006** 0.000 0.001** 0.001
(3.46) (2.75) (0.59) (2.78) (1.16)
Constant -1.424 -0.233 -1.252*** 0.498** -0.159
(-0.69) (-0.16) (-6.93) (2.74) (-0.93)
Observations 1,132 1,095 1,110 1,110 1,110
No. clusters 120 120 116 116 116
R2-within 0.451 0.220 0.932 0.216 0.041
Source: own
Note: FE estimator, company and year effects included; t-statistics in parentheses based on cluster-robust SE; * p<0.05, 
** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Tab. 5: ERM companies (after ERM implementation) compared to before implementation
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NOPAT FCF IC ROIC g rate
1_ERM years -0.041 -0.023 0.019* -0.009 -0.015
(-0.93) (-0.39) (2.11) (-1.96) (-1.48)
2_ERM years -0.042 -0.041 0.020 -0.009 -0.028*
(-0.81) (-0.63) (1.95) (-1.55) (-2.00)
3_ERM years -0.007 0.004 0.022 -0.008 -0.022
(-0.12) (0.05) (1.69) (-1.13) (-1.61)
4_ERM years 0.001 -0.094 0.012 0.000 -0.014
(0.02) (-0.68) (0.76) (0.05) (-0.68)
5_ERM years -0.032 0.159 0.024 -0.003 -0.006
(-0.41) (1.78) (1.33) (-0.32) (-0.30)
6_ERM years -0.043 0.400** 0.018 -0.005 -0.028
(-0.53) (3.28) (0.80) (-0.41) (-1.45)
7_ERM years -0.102 0.087 0.022 -0.016 -0.038
(-1.12) (0.58) (0.99) (-1.35) (-1.68)
8_ERM years -0.177 0.294 0.017 -0.018 -0.065
(-1.53) (1.79) (0.59) (-1.09) (-1.38)
9_ERM years -0.159 0.289 0.006 -0.039 -0.011
(-1.29) (1.53) (0.16) (-1.62) (-0.30)
10_ERM years -0.122 0.205 -0.006 -0.019 0.022
(-0.92) (1.07) (-0.09) (-0.83) (0.52)
Size 0.807*** 0.668*** 1.085*** -0.044** 0.029
(5.06) (5.62) (70.68) (-3.09) (1.92)
Leverage -0.179** -0.165 0.006 -0.030* -0.014
(-3.15) (-1.46) (0.81) (-2.39) (-0.84)
Growth opp. -1.655** -1.652*** 0.068 -0.239*** 0.065
(-2.61) (-3.37) (1.27) (-4.18) (0.75)
Dividend policy 0.125 0.053 0.007 0.026* 0.010
(1.68) (0.77) (0.41) (2.35) (0.54)
Volatility 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001
(4.30) (3.74) (0.63) (3.58) (1.01)
Constant -0.783 0.468 -1.087*** 0.520*** -0.246
(-0.53) (0.43) (-7.86) (4.03) (-1.82)
Observations 1,657 1,612 1,644 1,644 1,644
No. clusters 178 178 172 172 172
R2-within 0.437 0.228 0.941 0.214 0.035
Source: own
Tab. 6: The effects of ERM duration
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effects of ERM use are negative for the fi rst 
four years, but then they turn to positive. The 
coeffi cients are not statistically signifi cant, 
though, except for 6 years of using ERM: 
the results show that after 6 years of using 
ERM, FCF is 0.4 percent higher compared 
to observations without ERM. The effects on 
NOPAT are not statistically signifi cant, but their 
signs are mostly negative.
Taken together, it seems that the duration 
of ERM programs matters only for FCF. In the 
initial years after adoption, the effect on FCF 
is probably negative, but after that it seems to 
become positive. This fi nding is consistent with 
estimations in the literature that it takes three to 
fi ve years to develop a mature ERM program 
(Fraser & Simkins, 2010). The effects on the IC 
and the expected growth rate, however, seem 
to follow rather rapidly – within one to two years 
after ERM adoption.
Discussion and Conclusion
ERM programs are advocated as the solution 
for the failures and weaknesses of the traditional 
silo-based risk management in creating and 
protecting stakeholders’ value (Kirkpatrick, 
2009). Consistently also with the prevalent 
ERM literature, we argue that, if ERM is a value 
added activity, we should fi nd that it is positively 
related to a set of value determinants. We test 
this on a sample of U.S. listed non-fi nancial 
companies and fi nd mixed evidence in support 
of our hypothesis.
The results indicate that companies with 
ERM have a higher level of invested capital, 
in comparison to non-ERM companies, but 
they invest less additional capital and with less 
success in terms of earnings/return, therefore, 
the effect on the expected growth rate is 
negative. One possible explanation for this 
is that ERM seems to effectively discourage 
companies to invest in high risk/high return 
type of projects. Instead, companies cautiously 
invest less capital and in less risky projects with 
smaller returns, which do not contribute to the 
fundamental value enhancement. This suggests 
that ERM companies are more conservative in 
their investment strategies and they pay much 
more attention to the down-side risk then to the 
company’s up-side potential. Our study thus 
contributes to the existing body of knowledge 
about ERM by casting doubts on its supposed 
positive effects on the fundamental value drivers. 
Moreover, due to its negative effect on the 
expected growth rate, it could even negatively 
affect the fundamental value. On the positive 
side, the study revealed that ERM is indeed 
associated with higher free cash fl ows. But it 
seems this takes place only after using ERM for 
around 6 years, while the effects on the invested 
capital and expected growth rate follow within 
a year or two after the implementation of ERM.
However, since all limitations of observational 
studies apply also in our case and the tested 
models are explorative in nature, the fi ndings 
should be seen as indications rather than 
proofs of ERM causal effects. More theoretical 
and empirical research is needed to establish 
how ERM really works within a company and 
to whose benefi t. We conducted this study 
from the viewpoint of shareholder’s wealth 
maximization, which was the fundamental 
business goal for many past decades and for 
many companies. However, the global fi nancial 
crisis brought more attention to corporate 
social responsibility and stakeholders’ value 
protection. It is not responsible to maximize the 
wealth of shareholders by destroying value for 
other interested parties. Therefore, to determine 
whether ERM is a value added activity, and to 
whom it adds value, it is necessary to consider 
the different goals and risk appetites set in front 
of the companies that implement ERM. We 
interpret the implications for managerial practice 
in regional companies in this light as well. ERM 
is not an over-the-counter cure for businesses 
badly struck by a crisis, but it needs to be 
carefully prescribed to an individual company’s 
business objectives and risk appetite.
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AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER – ERM implemented in 2002
(Form: Proxy Statement, Schedule 14A; Filing date: Mar-25-2002)
p. 7: “Our strategy is a balanced business model of regulated and unregulated businesses backed by 
assets, supported by enterprise-wide risk management and a strong balance sheet. We have been 
focused on the wholesale side of the business since it provides the greater growth opportunities. But, this 
is complemented by a robust regulated business that has a predictable earnings stream and cash fl ows. 
Strong risk management and a disciplined analysis of markets protected us from the California energy 
crisis and Enron’s bankruptcy fi ling. “
p. 25: “Policies and procedures are established to identify, assess, and manage market risk exposures 
in our day to day operations. Our risk policies have been reviewed with the Board of Directors, approved 
by a Risk Management Committee and administered by a Chief Risk Offi cer. The Risk Management 
Committee establishes risk limits, approves risk policies, assigns responsibilities regarding the oversight 
and management of risk and monitors risk levels. This committee receives daily, weekly, and monthly 
reports regarding compliance with policies, limits and procedures. The committee meets monthly and 
consists of the Chief Risk Offi cer, Chief Credit Offi cer, V.P. Market Risk Oversight, and senior fi nancial 
and operating managers. “
CORNING INC - ERM implemented in 2005
(Form: Proxy Statement, Schedule 14A; Filing date: Mar-03-2010)
p. 20: “Corning has a comprehensive risk management program that engages the Company’s 
management/leadership and Board. Since 2005, the Company has employed an Enterprise Risk 
Management program (“ERM”) that was modelled on the COSO II framework. Corning’s ERM is 
a company-wide effort that involves the Board, management and Corning staff in an integrated effort to 
identify, assess and manage risks that may potentially affect the Company. A Risk Council, chaired by 
our Vice Chairman and Chief Financial Offi cer, Mr. Flaws, and composed of Corning management and 
staff, is a core governance element of the ERM.“
Appendix A Examples of ERM companies
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Comment: when searching the CapIQ database in non-ERM companies’ fi llings there were no hits on the 
key words: enterprise risk management, ERM, strategic risk management, integrated risk management, 
Chief Risk Offi cer, risk committee etc.; the only hits were when searching ‘risk management’. It can 
be seen from the fi llings’ clip that different corporate risks are managed “in silos”, without considering 
and analyzing their aggregate impact on the company’s goals. There is a lack of communication and 
cooperation between managers responsible for different risk categories, what makes the integration of 
risks hard to achieve.
AT&T Inc
(Form: Proxy Statement, Schedule 14A; Filing date: Mar-10-2011)
p. 3: “The Board of Directors oversees and reviews certain aspects of the Company’s risk management 
efforts…. In addition, under its charter, the Audit Committee reviews and discusses with management the 
Company’s major fi nancial risk exposures and the steps management has taken to monitor and control 
such exposures, including the Company’s risk assessment and risk management policies. Members of the 
Finance and Compliance groups are responsible for managing risk in their areas and reporting regularly 
to the Audit Committee. The Company’s chief audit executive meets annually in executive session with 
the Audit Committee. The chief audit executive reviews with the Audit Committee each year’s annual 
internal audit plan, which is focused on signifi cant areas of fi nancial, operating, and compliance risk. The 
Audit Committee also receives regular reports on completed internal audits of these signifi cant risk areas.“
Appendix B Example of a Non-ERM company
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1 1 0.39 0.39
10 2 0.78 1.16
13 12 4.65 5.81
14 1 0.39 6.20
15 1 0.39 6.59
16 1 0.39 6.98
20 13 5.04 12.02
21 2 0.78 12.79
23 2 0.78 13.57
24 2 0.78 14.34
25 2 0.78 15.12
26 7 2.71 17.83
27 1 0.39 18.22
28 25 9.69 27.91
29 3 1.16 29.07
30 3 1.16 30.23
33 4 1.55 31.78
34 5 1.94 33.72
35 14 5.43 39.15
36 21 8.14 47.29
37 10 3.88 51.16
38 16 6.20 57.36
39 2 0.78 58.14
40 3 1.16 59.30







44 1 0.39 60.08
45 2 0.78 60.85
48 9 3.49 64.34
49 25 9.69 74.03
50 2 0.78 74.81
51 4 1.55 76.36
52 2 0.78 77.13
53 8 3.10 80.23
54 2 0.78 81.01
55 2 0.78 81.78
56 4 1.55 83.33
57 2 0.78 84.11
58 4 1.55 85.66
59 4 1.55 87.21
70 2 0.78 87.98
72 1 0.39 88.37
73 23 8.91 97.29
75 1 0.39 97.67
79 1 0.39 98.06
80 2 0.78 98.84
82 1 0.39 99.22
87 1 0.39 99.61
99 1 0.39 100.00
Total 258 100
Appendix B Tab. A1: Industry structure of the sample at 2-digits SIC Code
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Abstract
IS ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT A VALUE ADDED ACTIVITY? 
Mojca Marc, Danijela Miloš Sprčić, Marina Mešin Žagar
Enterprise risk management (ERM) programs are advocated as the solution for the failures and 
weaknesses of the traditional silo-based risk management in creating and protecting stakeholders’ 
value. ERM encompasses activities and strategies which enable the company to systematically 
identify, measure, reduce or exploit, as well as to control and monitor the exposure to various 
types of corporate risks – strategic, fi nancial, operational, reporting as well as compliance risks. 
By considering the interactive effects of different risk events, ERM offers a balance between 
the dual nature of risk – ensuring effective protection from threats and seizing the opportunities. 
This paper explores the association between ERM and a set of fundamental value determinants 
of S&P 500 non-fi nancial companies over the period from 2003 to 2012. Contrary to arguments 
found in the existing ERM literature, ERM companies did not experience a positive effect on most 
of the value drivers. We fi nd that ERM is associated with lower expected growth rates within one 
to two years after the ERM adoption, indicating that ERM could even have a negative effect on 
the company’s fundamental value. On the other hand, the study showed that ERM is associated 
with higher free cash fl ows after six years of its use. Our research thus found indicative evidence 
that ERM produces some positive effects over a longer term, as well as some negative immediate 
effects, which could be explained with the increased risk aversion of ERM companies. However, 
since the tested models are explorative in nature, more theoretical and empirical research is needed 
to establish how ERM really works within a company.
Key Words: Enterprise Risk Management, value drivers, value creation, non-fi nancial 
companies.
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